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I. INTRODUCTION 
As states with collective bargaining requirements for public-
sector employees have moved to rednce or eliminate those 
requirements, attention has turned to the states without collective 
bargaining rights in an attempt to foresee the future. Unionization 
exists in southern states without collective bargaining laws, albeit in 
smaller percentages than in states that authorize bargaining.1 It is not 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author wishes to thank William R. 
Warwick, J.D., University of Richmond, 2012, for valuable research assistance, the American 
Association of Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law for the invitation 
to participate on the panel, and the panel members and audience for their valuable comments 
and questions about the presentation. 
1. See BARRY T. HIRSCH & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND 
EARNINGS DATA BOOK 32-37 (2011). The data in this volume arc taken from the Current 
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clear how much of this difference is a result of the absence of 
bargaining rights and how much is due to the historic hostility to 
unionization in the south. The unions in these southern states actively 
participate in representation of workers in the legislatures, local 
governing bodies, grievance, civil service and tenure procedures, and 
in court.' They offer their members benefits such as work-related 
training and product and service discounts.' Yet these union activities 
cannot occur without resources, and resources require membership 
and payment of union dues. A parent union may subsidize an affiliate 
to some degree, but such subsidies do not substitute for active union 
membership and dues payment. Without the latter, the union will 
eventually fade away. For the union, the most efficient method for 
collecting dues is payroll deduction. In the absence of payroll 
deduction, the union must establish and maintain its own dues 
collection apparatus, which will always be less efficient and more 
costly than payroll deduction. 
Many successful unions in Virginia and North Carolina have 
been able to obtain payroll deduction of union dues because of the 
state of the law in those jurisdictions. The ability of unions in states 
restricting collective bargaining to maintain their role will, in part, 
depend on their ability to do the same.' This article will look first at 
the law relating to payroll deduction of dues in Virginia and North 
Carolina and in several of the . states that have newly restrictive 
bargaining laws. The article will then discuss the significance of 
payroll ,deduction of union dues for effective representation of 
unionized employees. Next the article will analyze the existing law 
relating to constitutional challenges to statutory limitations on payroll 
deduction, along with the current legal challenge to the Wisconsin 
Population Survey, a inonthly survey of wage and -salary workers conducted by the Census 
Bureau. Id. at 1. Thus, the questions regarding union membership and coverage by a union 
contract are based on employee self-reporting, and an estimate is made based on the sample. Id. 
at 1-7. 
2. Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector 
Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 735, 749-55 (2009); Ann C. Hodges & 
Willian1 Warwick, The Sheathed Sword: Public Sector Union Efficacy in Non-Bargaining States, 
27 ABA J, LAB, & EMP, L 275, 278-82 (2012). 
3. Hodges & Warwick, supra note 2, at 282-83. 
4. While this article focuses on payroll deduction alone, fair share agreements combined 
with payroll deduction provide an even more valuable method for unions to provide effective 
representation. Fair share requires all employees represented by the union to pay the cost of 
representation. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1977). Of course in 
nonbargaining states, the union is not required to represent nonmembers, but nonmembers 
frequently benefit from union actions nevertheless, as legislative changes and even informal 
agreements and memoranda of understanding typically apply to all employees. 
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statute. Finally the article will consider how unions might maintain 
payroll deduction of union dues. The article concludes that while in 
some states successful challenges to restrictions on payroll deduction 
may occur, unions would be well-served to explore other options for 
maintaining union resources. 
II. PAYROLL DEDUCTION LAWS 
In both Virginia and North Carolina, although collective 
bargaining is outlawed,' unions may obtain payroll deduction of dues, 
easing the task of collecting membership dues. North Carolina 
authorizes payroll deduction of dues if an organization has at least 
2,000 members with 500 from the public sector.' In addition, local 
government units can agree to deduct dues for smaller organizations.' 
In Virginia, there is no express statutory authorization of dues 
deduction, but the General Assembly has rejected· bills to prohibit 
dues deduction.' Thus, at least at present, governmental units can 
agree to payroll deduction of union dues.' And if they allow 
deductions for one employee organization and deny deductions for 
others, they must articulate a constitutional basis for that distinction. '0 
Many unions have been able to obtain payroll deduction by 
agreement in Virginia.11 
One explanation for the governmental failure to press for dues 
deduction bans in states like North Carolina and Virginia may be the 
desire for lobbying assistance from associations representing public 
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §95-98 (2012); VA. CODE ANN.§ 40.1-57.2 (2011). 
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-426.40A(g) (2012). This statute was amended by the North 
Carolina legislature in January 2012 to remove the authority of local boards of education to 
deduct union dues, but a temporary restraining order prevented the amendment from taking 
effect, as the court concluded that it was likely unconstitutional. Andrew Ballard, North 
Carolina Court Teniporarily Blocks Ban on Teachers' Association Dues Deduction, 6 Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Jan. 10, 2012). A preliminary injunction was issued in May 2012 and 
enforcement of the statute was permanently enjoined in December 2012. See Order Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Denying Defendanls' Motion to Dismiss, N.C. 
Ass'n of Educators v. North Carolina, No. 12 CVS 404 (N.C. Superior Ct. May 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter N.C. Preliminary Injunction]; Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings, N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. North Carolina, No. 12 CVS 404 (N.C. Superior Ct. 
Dec. 17, 2012 [hereinafter N.C. Order]). For furlher discussion of the North Carolina 
amendments, see infra notes 116-121 
7. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 143B-426.40A(g). 
8. S. 963, 1993 Leg. Sess. (Va. 1993) (failed by a twenty-one to nineteen floor vote). A bill 
was introduced in 2012 to limit payroll deduction for state employee associalions, but the bill 
died in committee. See H.D. 1014, 2012 Leg, Sess. (Va. 2012). 
9. 1992 Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 126. 
10. Id. 
11. Hodges & Warwick, supra note 2, at 278. 
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employees to assist in accomplishing legislative goals. Where the 
unions lack the power to bargain, employers may take the calculated 
risk of allowing dues deduction to give employee organizations the 
power to lobby for funds that benefit the government employers 
without fear of making them more powerful at the bargaining table. 
And once the deduction is given to a group like a statewide employee 
association, which may be more amenable to employer influence, 
more militant unions can then press for similar treatment on 
constitutional grounds." 
The Wisconsin legislation, perhaps the most draconian of recent 
revisions, bans payroll deduction for all but public safety employees." 
The Ohio legislation, which was overturned by referendum in 
November 2011, banned payroll deduction only for contributions to 
political action committees except as provided in campaign finance 
law." Although Tennessee and Oklahoma eliminated bargaining 
rights of teachers and employees of large municipalities other than 
public safety employees, respectively, neither law barred payroll 
deductions." 
Both Arizona and Alabama allow payroll deduction of union 
dues, but both recently enacted limitations on the use of those dues 
for political purposes." The Alabama law limits public employee 
payroll deductions for political activity or for membership dues for 
organizations that use such dues for political activity. This prohibition 
may. appear narrower than a tot'al ban, but in effect would likely 
discoura~e all dues deductions because of the criminal sanctions 
12. See 1992 Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 126. The Virginia -Governmental Employees Association 
referenced in the opinion is still emphatically not a union. See Representing the Comnionwealth 's 
Employees_ and Retirees: The VGEA Works for You!, VA. GOVERNMENTAL EMP. ASS'N, 
<http://www.vgea.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid==l> (last visited Nov. 24, 2012) ("VGEA is 
not a union .... " (emphasis in original)). 
13. 2011 Wis. Act 10, §§ 58, 227, 298. The provision of the law banning payroll deduction 
was overturned on March 30, 2012. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 
(W.D. Wis. 2012), further discussed infra at notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
14. S. 5 § 4117.09(C), 129th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2011), available at <http://www. 
legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_SB_5_EN_N.pdf>. Ohio campaign finance law already 
required written consent from employees for deductions used for political purposes. See OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN.§§ 3517.09(C), 3599.031(LexisNexis2012). 
15. Ann C. Hodges, Southern Solutions for Wisconsin Woes, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 633, 641 
(2012). A bill has been introduced in Tennesseeto bar payroll deductions for political purposes, 
however, including deduction of dues for membership organizations that use funds for political 
purposes. See H.B. 594 (Tenn. 2011); S.B. 784 (Tenn. 2011). 
16. See ALA. CODE § 17-17-5 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02 (2011). The 
Arizona statute applies to both public- and private-sector employees. Proposed legislation in 
Arizona, however, would eliminate dues deduction for public employees. See inji·a note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
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imposed for violation of the law and the inability of individual 
employees to control the use of their dues.11 The Alabama law also 
requires the membership organizations to certify and prove each year 
that none of the membership dues were spent on political activity." 
Failure to do so or false submission would result in loss of the 
organization's ability to obtain dues deduction." The Arizona law 
requires organizations accepting dues through payroll deduction to 
certify that none of the dues are used for political purposes or to 
specify the percentage used for political purposes.20 It also requires a 
special written authorization from employees, renewed annually, to 
have deducted dues used for political purposes.21 . The law exempts 
charitable organizations, employee benefits organizations, and 
organizations of public safety officers from its provisions." Both these 
laws were enjoined by district courts on constitutional grounds." 
The efforts to limit dues deduction did not end in 2011. In 2012, 
the Michigan legislature barred payroll deduction of union dues for 
teachers, making it unlawful for a public education employer to use 
public resources to support payroll deduction of union dues or fees.24 
The Michigan law has been challenged by several unions on grounds 
similar to the Wisconsin legislation and is subject to a preliminary 
injunction granted June 11, 2012.25 The North Carolina legislature 
17. 2010 Alabama Acts 761 (amending ALA. CooE § 17-17-5). The Alabama law was 
enjoined from taking effect based on a First .Amendment challenge in Alabama Education Ass'n 
v. Bentley, which found the statute both overbroad and vague. 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1327-28 
(N.D. Ala. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit narrowed the injunction, however, allowing the law to 
take effect so long as it applied only to dues deductions for electioneering activities, certifying to 
the Alabama Supreme Court the following questions: "1. Is the 'or otherwise' language in the 
statute limited to the use of state mechanisms to support political organizations, or does it cover 
all contributions by state employees to political organizations, regardless of the source? 2. Does 
the term 'polilical activity' refer only to electioneering activities?" Ala. Educ. Ass'n v. State 
Sup't o!Educ., 665 F.3d 1234, 1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). 
18. 2010 Alabama Acts 761 (amending ALA. CooE § 17-17-5 (b)). 
19. Id. 
20. 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 251 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23-361.02). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
21. As stated supra note 17, the Alabama law was enjoined by the district court in Alabama 
Education Ass'n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28. The Court of Appeals narrowed the 
injunction, allowing it to take effect insofar as it served as a complete ban on deductions for 
organizations engaged in electioneering. Ala. Educ. Ass'n, 665 F.3d at 1239. The court further 
certified the question of the meaning of the statute to the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. at 1238-
39. The Arizona law was also invalidated on First Amendment grounds, as the court found it 
was not viewpoint neutral because it applied to some unions but not others and did not apply to 
other organizations that could use funds for political purposes. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124-25 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
24. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 53. 
25. See Nora Macaluso, Michigan School E1nployee Unions Sue Over La,w Barring Payroll 
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took similar action, although that law also has been enjoined from 
taking effect based on the procedural process followed in enactment, 
which the court found violated North Carolina's constitution." 
Legislation has been introduced in other states to eliminate or limit 
payroll deduction of union dues." Additionally, a referendum was on 
the ballot in 2012 in California to ban payroll deduction of political 
contributions, but it was rejected by voters." Similar proposals were 
rejected by the voters in 199829 and 2005.30 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNION DUES 
Although the National Right to Work Committee and similar 
organizations have attempted to brand collection of union dues as a 
self-interested grab for power and money," the simple truth is that 
unions, like any other organization, cannot accomplish their purpose 
Deduction for Dues, 50 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 451 (Apr. 10, 2012). The Michigan law 
was enjoined from taking effect on constitutional grounds. Order Granting Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Bailey v. Callaghan, No. 2:12-cv-11504, 2012 WL 2115300 (E.D. Mich. 
June 11, 2012) [hereinafter Michigan Order]. In August, the court denied a stay of the 
injunction pending appeal. 2012 WL 3134338 (E.D.Mich. Aug.1, 2012) 
26. See supra note 6. 
27. See S. 1487, 50th Leg., Zd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (prohibiting withholding of public 
employees' wages for any labor organization); S. 553, 96th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2012) (setting voter referendum to bar payroll deduction of union dues and requiring employee 
consent to use dues and fees for political purpose&); H.R. 1230, 96th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo.2012) (allowing payroll deduction of political contributions solicited by employers or 
unions if employee consents in writing each year); H.R. 1163, 2012 Leg. Sess. (N.H. 2012) 
(barring employ~rs from withholding union dues); H.R. 1206, 2012 Leg. Sess. (N.H. 2012) 
(barring the state from withholding union dues from state employees); H.R. 4652, 1.19th Leg. 
Sess. (S.C. 2012) (allowing employees to revoke dues deduction at any ti1ne). The latter bill was 
enacted after elimination of the provision relating to dues. Andrew M. Ballard, South Carolina 
Lawmakers Approve Bill Aimed at Discouraging Activity by Unions, 110 Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) All (June 7, 2012). 
28. The California measure, entitled Stop Special Interest Money Now Act, qualified for a 
ballot initiative for November 2012 and included a provision prohibiting public and private 
employers from payroll deduction of funds to be used for political purposes e. See Initiative to 
Ban Payroll Deduction for Political Spending Qualifies, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 6, 201.1), <htt 
p://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2011/12/initiative-to-ban-payroll-deduction-for-political-
spending-qualifies.html>; Letter from Ashlee Titus to Att'y Gen., Initiative Measure to Be 
Submitted Directly to the Voters (Apr. 1, 201.1), available at<http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments 
/initiatives/pdfs/i941_initiat:ive_ll-0010.pdf>. The proposition was defeated. Evan Halper & 
Anthony York, Blue Reign in Sacramento; Democrats' Historic Gains Position them for 
Unchecked Power, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at Al. 
29. Paul F. Clark, Using Members' Dues for Political Purposes: The "Paycheck Protection" 
Movement, 20 J. LAB RES. 329, 329 (1999). 
30. Peter Nicholas & Jordan Rau, Results Unsettle Gov. 's Supporters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2005, at A1, available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/la-me-electionlOnovl0,0,1.306155, 
full.story>. 
31. Why We Fight, NAT'L RT. TO WORK COMM., <http:/lwww.nrtwc.org/about-2/why-we-
fight/> (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
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of representation of employees and balancing the power of employers 
without resources. The sophistication of employers, the complexity of 
benefit programs such as pension and health insurance plans, the size 
and intricacy of governmental budgets, and the powerful anti-tax and 
anti-government lobbies, among other things, require a sophisticated 
and powerful union to accomplish the goals and protect the interests 
of public employees." Labor unions have limited ability to raise funds 
from sources other than their members, or in some states, all 
employees who they represent." Accordingly, union dues are not a 
self-interested obsession of union officials, but rather a necessity to 
permit the organization to continue to operate. And employees 
dissatisfied with their union representation can replace the union with 
another, remove the union altogether, or choose new leadership in 
the mandatory elections." Without a representative to provide voice 
in the workplace, the only option employees have is to leave their 
employment. 
Payroll deduction is important because it provides an effective 
mechanism for dues collection that requires no actii:Jn on the part of 
the employee except a single authorization. Dues are then deducted 
by the employer each pay period and remitted to the union. In the 
absence ofpayroll deduction, unions must establish a mechanism for 
dues collection, and none is available that is comparable to payroll 
deduction.35 The union must then expend resources on dues collection 
32. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221 (1977); Clyde Sum1ners, 
Bargaining in the Governn1ent's Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 269, 
272, 279 (1987). 
33. In states that allow fair share, unions can require nonmembers to pay the cost of 
representation but not the cost of political advocacy. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36. 
34. See MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 391-92, 787 {2d ed. 
2011). 
35. For example, in 1988, the Gwinnett County Association of Educators lost 430 
members, about one-third of its me1nbership and $81,000 as a result of the employer's 
termination of dues deduction. See Ga. Ass'n of Educators v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 856 
F.2d 142, 144 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1988). When dues deduction was ceased for the United 
Federation of Teachers in 1982, it lost 30 percent of its normal inco1ne from dues in the first two 
months of the suspension, requiring staff layoffs and temporary closing of offices through which 
it provided representation services. United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2, 15 N.Y. PERE <][ 3091 
(1982). In 2005, cessation of dues deduction for the Transport Workers Union resulted in less 
than half of bargaining unit members paying their full dues for the first three months, with the 
union receiving only 64.7 percent of the income it would have received with dues deduction. 
Affidavit of Roger Toussaint,<][ 13, MTA Bus Co. v. Transp. Workers Union of Greater N.Y. 
Local 100, 851 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (No. 2005-37468), 2005 WL 6242982. Similarly, 
when the City of Detroit and Wayne County, Michigan ceased payroll dues collection, 
AFSCME Council 25 saw an iminediate drop in dues collection of 55 percent and an eventual 
drop of 81 percent. Affidavit of Lawrence Roehdg, Exh. 2, § 8, Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Bailey v. Callaghan, No. 2:12-cv-11504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
11, 2012), available at <https://www.bloo1nberglaw.com/document/2048054380400386?imagc 
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that might otherwise be spent on activities that directly benefit the 
membership. 
One might argue that the drop off in dues payment that occurs 
when automatic payroll deduction is stopped indicates that employees 
do not truly desire union membership and representation. That may 
be true of some employees, but the facts belie that claim in many 
instances. For example, one of the cases where a substantial drop 
occurred was in Georgia," a right to work state where union 
membership was completely voluntary" and where the traditional 
southern hostility to unionization flourished. That the employees 
whose dues were deducted chose union representation in such a 
climate suggests that their support of the union was real. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of dues deduction, many simply failed to 
pay their dues. 
Union dues not only fund representation activities and member 
benefits, but unions also spend funds on political activities." In the 
public sector, political activities are not only generally related to 
employees' terms and conditions of employment, as in the private 
sector," but also provide "the opportunity to affect the decisions of 
government representatives who sit on the other side of the 
bargaining table."'° Many terms and conditions of employment are set 
by law in the public sector, even in collective bargaining states, and 
thus political activity and lobbying provide a vehicle to influence 
these laws." Further, the political process may afford public 
name=11-4.pdf>. Even in hiatus periods between contracts when dues deduction is not 
available, the delinquency rate is substantial, requiring devotion of resources to collection rather 
than representation. Affidavit of Gretchen Dziadosz, Exh. 1, § 6, Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Bailey v. Callaghan, No. 2;12-cv-11504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
11, 2012), available at <https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/2048054380400386?imagen 
ame=ll-3.pdf>. 
36. See Ga. Ass'n of Educators, 856 F.Zd at 144 & n.5. 
37. See GA. CODE ANN.§ 34-6-23 (2011). 
38. Of course, political activity is a broad term that might encompass varied conduct 
including campaign funds for candidates or ballot initiatives as well as lobbying. For example, 
the Idaho law restricting payroll deduction for political activities upheld in Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Education Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009), defined political activities as "electoral activities, 
independent expenditures, or expenditures made to any candidate, political party, political 
action committee or political issues committee or in support of or against any ballot measure." 
Id. at 356 (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 44-2602(l)(e) (2003)). 
39. For example, a union might lobby for enactment or amendment of a statute that 
benefits employees such as the Family and Medical Leave Act or a workers' compensation 
statute. 
40. Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431U.S.209, 228 (1977). 
41. Catherine Fisk & Brian Olney, Labor and the States' Fiscal Problems: Not the Probleni 
But Perhaps Part of the Solution, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE 253, 263 (Peter Conti-Brown & 
David Skeel eds., 2012). 
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employees more direct influence on matters such as government 
appropriations that increase employer resources." In states without 
collective bargaining, the importance of political activity is magnified 
by the absence of the bargaining process as a means of influencing the 
employer. When states pass statutes limiting the use of dues for 
political purposes through payroll deduction limitations or otherwise, 
the political contributions of public-sector unions drop," impacting 
their ability to use political activity to benefit the membership. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PAYROLL DEDUCTION 
BANS 
Statutory bans on payroll deduction like the one recently enacted 
in Wisconsin face constitutional challenge. There are two pot<:mtial 
grounds of challenge for such bans, the First Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has. addressed dues 
deduction under both theories. 
A. 'First Amendment 
In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass'n,44 the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether Idaho's ban on payroll deduction 
of public employees' contributions to union political activities 
violated the First Amendment. Ysursa did not involve a ban on 
payroll deduction of union dues in general, but rather deduction of 
dues used for political purposes.45 The Court rejected the First 
Amendment challenge, stating that the law merely declined to assist 
in promoting speech and did not actively abridge the employees' 
freedom of speech.46 As a result, the state need only show a rational 
basis for its decision, and the desire to avoid entanglement in partisan 
42. For a discussion of which activities are chargeable to objecting fee payers in fair share 
states, see Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). In Davenport v. Washington 
Education Ass'n, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Washington statute that barred the 
use of agency fees paid by nonmembers for political purposes, rejecting a claim that it 
unconstitutionally burdened the union's First Amendment rights. 551 U.S. 177 (2007). 
43. JAMES SHERK, HERITAGE CTR. FOR DATA ANALYSIS, CDA06-08, WHAT DO UNION 
MEMBERS WANT? WrrAT PAYCHECK PR01EC'TION LAWS SHOW ABOUT HOW WELL UNIONS 
REFLECT THEIR MEMBERS' PRIORITIES 7-9 (2006), available at <http://www.heritage.org/re 
search/reports/2006/08/what-do-uni on-members-want-what -paycheck -protection-laws-show-ab 
out -how-well-unions-reflect -their-members-priorities>. 
44. 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
45. Id. at 353. Utah has a similar law, enacted in 2001 and upheld by the Tenth Circuit in 
2009. See Utah Educ. Ass'n v. Shurtleff, 565 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 34-32-1.1 (2008)). 
46. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359. 
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politics satisfied that standard." That the law might reduce funds 
available to the union was of no moment in the absence of a direct 
abridgement of speech.48 
While this decision might seem to doom any challenge to payroll 
deduction bans, it does require at least a rational basis to support 
such a ban. Further, cases in recent years have demonstrated that not 
every rationale of government constitutes a rational basis." Courts 
require "that the classification bear a rational relationship to an 
independent and legitimate legislative end, [to] ensure that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the 
group burdened by the law. "'0 In addition, if the legislation more 
directly impairs First Amendment rights, strict scrutiny will be 
applied." While the government can freely decline to assist or fund 
citizen speech, it cannot do so for reasons based on viewpoint." Once 
it chooses to subsidize any speech, it cannot make subsidy decisions 
based on viewpoint. Because many dues deduction bans apply to 
some groups of employees and organizations and not others, they are 
vulnerable to legal challenge." 
B. Equal Protection 
In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Ass'n of 
Firefighters," the Court upheld the city's refusal to deduct union dues 
despite the fact that it granted ct,eduction requests for other purposes. 
47. l,d. 
48. Id. 
49. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
50. Id. at 633. 
51. See S.C. Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1263 (4th Cir. 1989). 
52. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (stating "even in 
the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas,"' quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461U.S.540, 550 (1983), and 
"a more pressing constitutional question would arise if Government funding resulted in the 
imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from 
the marketplace"' quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S.105, 116 (1991)); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
(holding that denial of student activities funds on the basis of viewpoint violated the First 
Amendment, despite space and funding limitations). 
53. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 3858 v. City of Germantown, 98 F. Supp. 2d 
939, 948 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (invalidating statute requiring dues deductions for firefighters in 
some counties and not others, finding no rational basis for distinguishing between them that was 
relevant to dues deduction); Truck Drivers & 1-Ielpers Local Union No. 728 v. City of Atlanta, 
468 F. Supp. 620, 623 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (reaching similar conclusion regarding dues deduction 
distinctions between police and firefighters, finding any distinction in their functions was 
unrelated to dues deduction). 
54. 426 U.S. 283 (1976). 
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The Court held that the city's established standards for determining 
which dues deduction requests it would grant met the rational basis 
test.55 
The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for 
programs of general interest in which all city or departmental 
employees can, without more, participate. Employees can 
participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside 
organization the union. Thus, Local 660 does not fit the category of 
groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying 
withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim 
only some departmental employees as members and that 
employees must first join before being eligible to participate in the 
checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, this division seems a 
reasonable method for providing the benefit of withholding to 
employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number 
of instances of withholdinJl and the financial and administrative 
burdens attendant thereon. 
The decision indicates that a total ban on payroll deduction of 
association or union dues would pass muster, at least if the employer 
does not allow any othe;·deductions for outside organizations. 
C. Lower Court Decisions 
Applying the Supreme Court's standards, lower courts have 
upheld some dues deduction policies which distinguish among eligible 
deductions or organizations, while striking down others. The courts 
have addressed statutory dues deduction limitations on both First 
Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. With respect to these 
claims, courts have typically focused on the absence of any duty to 
affirmatively assist employees in the exercise of their rights to speech 
and association, drawing from that conclusion a right to condition the 
privilege of dues checkoff on meeting rational statutory requirements, 
so long as the requirements don't directly burden the associational or 
speech rights." 
In Memphis American Federation of Teachers, Local 2032 v. 
Board of Education of Memphis City Schools,58 the court rejected 
both First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to the 
55. Id. al 288. 
56. Id. 
57. See, e.g., Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 319-22 (6th Cir.1998); 
S.C. Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1257-62 (4th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Alexander, 718 
F.2d 1417, 1423 (6th Cir. 1983). 
58. 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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employer's grant of exclusive dues deduction privileges to a union 
which was the majority representative of the employees, while 
refusing to deduct dues from rival unions." The court found that the 
goals of labor peace and stability justified the grant of this privilege to 
the authorized representative only." 
In Brown v. Alexander,61 the court, applying strict scrutiny, struck 
down a requirement that labor organizations be independent and 
unaffiliated in order to obtain dues checkoff privileges because such a 
requirement directly burdened the associational rights of the union 
without a compelling justification." Applying the rational basis test, 
the court upheld requirements that the organization be domestic, 
have membership of at least 20 percent of the employees in the 
executive branch of the state government, and have as one of its 
objectives the promotion of an effective and efficient governmental 
work force." The court concluded that the numerosity requirement, 
like the limitation of checkoff to majority union representatives, 
served the goal of labor peace by limiting the number of competing 
unions." And since employees are required to promote efficient 
service, the court saw no constitutional flaw in requiring their 
associations to do so as a condition of obtaining payroll deduction. 65 
In South Carolina Education Ass'n v. Campbell, the court upheld 
as rationally related to a governmental purpose a law which barred 
dues deductions for all membership organizations except one open to 
all state employees." The court recognized several legitimate bases 
for the distinction, including the administrative and financial burdens 
of deducting dues for every requesting organization and fostering 
healthy employment relations with its own employees through the 
. organization open to all state employees." Where termination of dues 
59. ld. at 702-03. 
60. Id. Other cases have reached the same result. See Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 858 v. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1. 314 F. Supp. 1069, 1076 (D. Colo. 1970); Bauch v. New York, 237 N.E.2d 211, 
212 (N.Y. 1968). The Supreme Court approved the award of exclusive privileges based on the 
union's status as majority union representative in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local 
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 54 (1983) (upholding as permissible under the First Amendment 
an agreement allowing only the designated union representative, and not other unions, to use 
the teacher mailboxes and intraschool mail system). 
61. 718 F.2d at 1423. 
62. Id. at 1426. 
63. Id. at 1424-25. 
64. Ed. at 1424. 
65. Ed. at 1425. 
66. 883F.2d1251, 1262-64 (4th Cir.1989). 
67. Id. at 1263-64. The court also found no First Amendment violation. Id. at 1256-57. 
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checkoff is in retaliation for the exercise of speech and associational 
rights, however, it violates the First Amendment, although the 
employer need not provide the checkoff in the first instance.68 
D. The Wisconsin Challenge 
Until the recently enacted Michigan and North Carolina 
legislation, the Wisconsin law was the only recently enacted law that 
totally bans payroll deduction of dues for some categories of 
employees. A group of unions in Wisconsin filed a lawsuit challenging 
the Wisconsin ban on payroll deduction along with other aspects of 
the new Wisconsin law. The complaint alleged both First Amendment 
and Equal Protection claims, based primarily on the factual 
circumstances of the Wisconsin law which bars payroll deduction for 
all employees except public safety employees." The complaint 
alleged, inter alia, that the law removed the ability of the "disfavored" 
group of employees to use payroll deduction to financially support 
the activities of the union, including the political speech of the union, 
while permitting the favored group of public safety employees to 
support their unions, many of which supported the election of the 
governor who proposed the legislation.70 According to the complaint, 
the distinctions have no rational relation to a legitimate state 
objective and burden speech based on the identity and viewpoint of 
the speaker, thereby violating both the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments." 
The state articulated several defenses to the claim. On the First 
Amendment claim, the state first argued that there was no core 
political speech involved because union dues are used for many 
purposes and may not be used for political speech at all.72 Further, the 
refusal to subsidize speech through payroll deduction does not 
68. Ga. Ass'n of Educators v. Gwinnett Coty. Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 142, 144-46 (11th Cir. 
1988) (reversing summary judgment for employer on claim of retaliatory revocation of dues 
deduction because of conflicting evidence on the employer's motive). The district court in 
Arkansas State Highway Employees v. Kell apparently held to the contrary, but the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision on other grounds. 628 F.2d 1099, 1102, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 1980). 
69. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, <j[<Jj 1-5, Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. 
Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (No. 3:11-cv·00428·wmc). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, at 19-20, Wis. 
Educ. Ass'n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (No. 3:11-cv-00428-wmc) [hereinafter Defendants' 
Brief]. 
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abridge speech in any way, according to the employer.73 Finally, the 
state argued that there was no viewpoint discrimination because any 
discrimination was based on the type of organization, not the 
viewpoint of the organization." On the equal protection claim, the 
state argued that only a rational basis was required since no 
fundamental right or suspect classification was involved.75 The 
articulated rational basis was to prevent any work stoppage by public 
safety employees that would create a public safety risk.76 
In March, the court, without ever ruling on a preliminary 
injunction request, issued a decision on the merits, striking down the 
dues deduction provision of the law.77 The court found that the 
employer's rationale of preventing strikes by public safety employees 
did not justify withholding dues deduction from general employees, 
but not public safety employees. The court concluded that the 
selective restriction of dues deduction burdened the speech of both 
the employees and their unions." Citing the controversial decision of 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission," the court pointed 
out that the availability of a more onerous alternative for collecting 
dues did not relieve the burden on constitutional rights."° Having 
found a burden on speech, the court then looked for an adequate 
justification and found none." The employer cited no justification, 
relying on the argument that denial of dues deduction did not 
implicate the First Amendment at all. The court considered the 
argument that the legislation would prevent public safety strikes, but 
foutid any relationship between dues deduction and strikes tenuous at 
best." T·he court concluded that the only apparent reason for 
differential treatment was the different viewpoints of the unions, 
73. Id. at 21 ·22. 
74. Id. at 23-24. 
75. Id. at 2·3, 6. 
76. Id. at 8·9. 
77. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 859-60 & n.2. The court declined to strike 
down the provisions limiting collective bargaining to wages for general employees (all but public 
safety employees), accepting the state's rationale that the distinction was justified by the goal of 
avoiding strikes by public safety employees. Id. at 866. The court struck down the 
unprecedented requirement that general employee unions be recertified as representatives each 
year, including the requirement that the union obtain support from 51 percent of the bargaining 
unit employees, not just those voting, finding the justification for the distinction between unions 
insufficient. Id. al 864. 
78. Id. at 871. 
79. 130 S.Ct. 876, 897 (2010). 
80. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 871. 
81. Id. at 875. 
82. Id. at 868. 
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noting that Ysursa upheld the ban on all political dues deduction to 
avoid partisan political entanglement and here there was at least 
"apparent, if not actual, favoritism and entanglement" because of the 
discriminatory legislation.83 
The district court's decision is, of course, not the last word in this 
pitched battle. The state almost immediately filed a notice of appeal 
and asked the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a stay of the 
judge's injunction against enforcing the law pending resolution of the 
appeal." 
V. MAINTAINING PAYROLL DEDUCTION 
It is perhaps initially surprising that right-to-work, traditionally 
anti-union states like Virginia85 have not expressly banned payroll 
deduction of union dues.86 The explanation may lie in the fact that 
employers value the support of statewide employee associations, and 
in some cases educational associations and unions as well, as lobbying 
forces supporting the objectives of the government agencies and 
school districts. And in the anti-union south, ·without collective 
bargaining rights, that support may outweigh any threat posed by the 
unions to the employers' interests. Yet dues deduction has helped the 
unions survive in the hostile environments of the southern states . 
Current efforts to curb payroll deduction are driven by a perception 
that public-sector unions are too powerful" and have emerged in 
83. Id. at 876. 84. "Michael Bologna, Wisconsin Attorney General Seeks llalt to Ruling for Collective 
Bargaining Rights, 69 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (Apr.10, 2012). The stay was denied, except 
as to unions that have been decertified. Opinion and Order, Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. 
Walker, No. 3:11-cv-428-wmc (W.D. Wis. Apr. 27, 2012). Accordingly, dues deduction had to be 
reinstated by May 31, 2012 for unions that had not been decertified. Id. The case was argued 
before the Seventh Circuit in September 2012. Michael Bologna, Seventh Circuit /iears Oral 
Argu1nent in Challenge to Wisconsin Labor Law, 185 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Sept. 24, 
2012). A few days earlier, in a different case, the Dane County Circuit Court found that many 
provisions of the law, including the limit on payroll deduction of dues, violate the free speech 
and equal prolection provisions of both the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions. Madison 
Teachers, Inc. v. Scott Walker, Case No. 11CV3774 (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://op. 
bna.com/dircases.nsf/r?Openo::mcan-8y8qd2. Just as this article was going to press, the Seventh 
Circuit issued a decision upholding the entire statute, thus reversing the district court's holding 
that the dues deduction provisions were unconstitutional. See Wisconsin Education Ass'n 
Council v. Walker, Nos.12-1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (Jan. 19, 2013). 
85. RICHARD C. !(EARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 32-33 {4th ed. 
2009); Hodges, supra note 2, at 758-63. 
86. Even South Carolina allowed deduction of dues for the state employees association, 
while banning it for the state NBA affiliate. S.C. Educ. Ass'n v. Ca1npbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1253 
(4th Cir. 1989). 87. See Christopher Ruddy, Public-Service Unions Are Too Powe1ful, NEWSMAX (Mar. 9, 
2011, 12:03 PM), <http://www.newsmax.com/Ruddy/scott-walker-unions-wisconsin/2011/03/09/ 
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some states with a long history of unionization such as Wisconsin and 
Michigan. 
A. Bans on Deductions for Political Purposes 
In recent years, with a few exceptions, most of the focus on 
limiting dues deduction has been on deductions for political 
purposes." While these bans are somewhat less debilitating than bans 
on deducting any dnes, depending on their strncture they can create 
several problems for nnions. First, it may be difficult to discern what 
constitute political expenditures under the statute." Second, it may 
require complex, sophisticated and therefore expensive, reporting 
and accounting to separate permissible and banned expenditures.90 
Particularly in the public sector, where government officials are the 
employer, political activity is deeply embedded in union 
representational activities. These bans may chill legitimate union 
activity for fear of rnnning afoul of the statute. Further, the greater 
the restrictions on collective bargaining, the more important political 
activity and lobbying are to employee representation. 
Two primary rationales have emerged for such limitations, one a 
concern for compelling employees to support political causes through 
union dues91 and the other a concern for restricting govermuent 
entanglement in politics and avoiding any suggestion of political 
corrnption.":' Underlying both, how..,ver, is the reality that unions lean 
heavily Democratic and any impairment of their ability to collect 
id/388874>; see also John 0. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector 
Unions, PoL'Y REV., Aug./Sept. 2010, at 3, available at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/ 
policy-review/article/43266>; Steven Greenhouse, A Watershed Moment for Public-Sector 
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2011, at A14, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
02/19/us/19union.html>. 
88. See Clark, supra note 29, at 333-34 (describing "paycheck protection" efforts spurred 
by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) to bar unions from collecting dues for 
political purposes using state and federal legislation and state voter initiatives); see also ALA. 
CODE§ 17-17-5 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23-361.02 (2011); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. 
Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). Recently, however, several states have focused on barring 
deductions for education unions. See infra notes 133-134. 
89. See supra note 17, and accompanying text. 
90. See Calvin Siemer, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association: Accounting to Financial Core 
Members: Much A-Dues About Nothing?, 60 FORDHAML. REV.1057, 1076-77 (1992) (discussing 
the difficulty and expense for unions of differentiating between chargeable and non-chargeable 
expenditures); see also Ala. Educ. Ass'n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1318-22 (N.D. Ala. 
2011) (discussing difficulties of compliance with Alabama legislation). 
91. SHERK, supra note 43; Clark, supra note 29, at 329. 
92. See, e.g., Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 361. More recently, this justification has taken a different 
shape, as critics argue that dues deduction gives unions too much power to affect the operations 
of government through bargaining and/or lobbying. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
2012] MAINTAINING UNION RESOURCES 615 
funds benefits Republican and conservative causes.93 Supporters of 
both political and general restrictions on payroll deduction of dues 
are conservative and Republican groups." While this support suggests 
a motive of suppressing political speech with a certain viewpoint," 
without more it is unlikely to convince courts to invalidate restrictions 
as the motives of supporters of legislation are not automatically 
attributed to legislators. Courts are notoriously reluctant to probe the 
views of individual legislators to discern the motive for particular 
legislation." Evidence of political motives can be discerned from the 
form and timing of the legislation in many cases, however, and such 
93. Clark, supra note 29, at 340; Richard Michael Fischl, "Running the Government Like a 
Business": Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 39-
40, 60-63 (June 21, 2011), <http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/996.pdf>; Beau Hodai, 
Publicopoly Exposed: flow ALEC, the Koch Brothers and Their Corporate Allies Plan to 
Privatize, IN THESE Til\IIBS (July 11, 2011), <http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/11603/>. 
94. See SHERK, supra note 43; Clark, supra note 29, at 334-36, 340; McGinnis & 
Schanzenbach, supra note 87; Joel Rogers & Laura Dresser, Business Domination Inc., THE 
NATION, Aug. 1, 2011, at 18, 18-20, available at <http://www.thenation.co,mlarticle/161977/alec-
exposed-business-domination-inc>; Who's Behind Paycheck "Protection'', CAL. EDUCATOR, 
Sept. 2005, at 16, 16-17, available at <http://archive.cta.org/NR/rdonlyres/D05CC266-CE27-
4C10-BF4D-34ABA0101784/0/features.pdf>; Hodai, supra note 93; Gary D. Robertson, Late-
Night Veto Override Maneuver Risky for N.C. GOP, 11IE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Jan. 8, 2012), <htt 
p://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/latenight-veto-override-maneuver-risky-nc-gop>; 1-listory, AM. 
LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, <http://www.alec.org/about-alec/history/> (last visited Nov. 26, 
2012); Frequently Asked Questions, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, <http://www. 
alec.org/about-alec/frequently-asked-questions/> (last visited Nov. 26, 2012); infra note 129 and 
accompanying text.. 
95. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, AM. CONSTITUTION Soc'Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY, ISSUE 
BRIEF, 11IE ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: REAL HARMS AND 
IMAGINARY BENEFITS 1, 14-15 (2011), available at <https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default 
/files/Slater_Collective_Bargaining.pdf> (arguing that the efforts by Republican governors and 
legislators to change public-sector collective bargaining laws and limit dues deduction are 
motivated by desire to weaken unions, which have traditionally supported the Democratic 
party); Fisk & Olney, supra note 41, at 254-55 (arguing that the fiscal problems of states are not 
caused by collective bargaining and that the lines drawn in the Wisconsin legislation between 
public safety employees and teachers appear to be more about politics than budgets); Paul M. 
Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 
293-95 (2012) (arguing that the coordinated legislative efforts to curtail collective bargaining 
and impose other restrictions on unions in Wisconsin and other states were an attempt to 
restrict the political power of organizations that advocate for working and middle class 
Americans); Fischl, supra note 93, at 60-63 (arguing that the Wisconsin legislation was 
substantially motivated by a desire to defunct the Democratic party <ind silence the political 
voice of workers). 
96. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) 
(stating that "[t]his Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130-131 
(1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial 
intrusion into the workings of other branches of government. Placing a decisionmaker on the 
stand is therefore 'usually to be avoided'"; quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
401U.S.402, 420 (1971) (additional citations omitted)); United States v. O'Brien, 391U.S.367, 
384 (1968) (stating "[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not 
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us 
to eschew guesswork); S.C. Educ. Ass'n v. Campbe11, 883F.2d1251, 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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evidence offers more promising grounds for reversal of dues 
deduction bans." 
To overturn a statutory ban, Ysursa would require a showing 
either that no rational basis for the ban exists or that it was designed 
to suppress speech based on viewpoint or to retaliate for exercise of 
constitutional rights. Under equal protection doctrine, a similar 
showing of no rational basis would suffice or, if there is unequal 
treatment on the basis of viewpoint, a more compelling justification 
would be required." Each situation is, of course, unique, but previous 
cases demonstrate some elements that may make a statutory ban 
vulnerable to challenge as viewpoint discrimination. A statute that 
bars dues deduction for some, but not all unions, may suggest 
viewpoint discrimination.99 The history of the unions' political 
activities, the timing of the legislation in relation to those activities, 
and statements from sponsors and legislative supporters of the law 
may help to demonstrate the motivation to suppress particular 
speech.100 
B. General Bans on Payroll Deduction of Dues 
General dues bans may pose an additional litigation hurdle. Like 
the state of Wisconsin, the employer may argue that the dues ban 
does not impact "core political speech" and therefore does not violate 
the First Amendment.101 Further, with a political contributions ban, it 
may be easier to trigger strict scrutiny based on the argument that a 
fundamental right is involved.102 Nevertheless, even bans on political 
97. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (noting that in determining the motive for 
legislative action, the impact of the decision, the history of the action including contemporary 
statements by decisionmakers and official minutes and reports of the action, the sequence of 
events leading up to the decision, and the historical background of the decision are all relevant 
factors). 
98. The controversial Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision has 
reaffirmed the salience of speaker identity discrimination under the First Amendment. 130 S.Ct. 
876, 898 (2010) (stating, "[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment 
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are 
restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. As 
instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the 
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content" (citations omitted)). 
99. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124-25 
(D. Aiiz. 2011). Of course some courts have upheld such distinctions based on size of the union 
or on the basis that the organization must be open to all employees. See, e.g., S.C. Educ. Ass'n, 
883 F.2d at 1263-64; Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1417, 1424-25 (6th Cir. 1983). 
100. These factors may also support challenges to general dues deduction bans and are 
discussed further infra at notes 105-134. 
101. Defendants' Brief, supra note 72, at 19-20. 
102. This argument has not been successful in the past where a complete ban is involved. See 
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speech may not require strict scrutiny if they are sufficiently broad to 
defeat a claim of viewpoint discrimination without being so 
overbroad or vague as to chill political speech.103 
Universal bans, whether focused on dues for any outside 
organization or political deductions for any purpose are almost 
certain to be upheld.104 When the prohibition is not universal, 
however, the potential for establishing either a First Amendment or 
Equal Protection violation rises. Careful scrutiny of the provisions of 
the legislation, the ostensible rationale for its passage and any 
evidence of other purposes, the groups covered and not covered, and 
the actual effects of the legislation may reveal the basis for a 
successful legal attack. 
C. Strategies for Challenging Bans 
1. Establishing the Purpose and Effect 
The key factor for a succes~.ful challenge to dues deduction bans 
is establishing a purpose of suppressing political 'viewpoint or 
retaliating for political speech. In these times of intense political 
polarization, the ammunition for challenging a dues ban might be 
more easily available. Legislative strategies and comments by 
politicians are more likely to identify political viewpoint as a 
motivation for legislative bans. The Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Citizens United provides support for close scrutiny of barriers to 
speech based on the identity of the speaker.105 Further any 
administrative justification for banning dues deduction in this age of 
computerization of payroll has limited utility.106 Finally, courts may be 
somewhat more willing to explore and recognize political motivations 
supporting legislation.107 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009). 
103. See id. at 359-60. 
104. Id. at 361 n.3. 
105. Citizens United v. Fed'l Election Comm'n,130 S.Ct. 876, 899 (2010). 
106. When payroll is computerized, a function for deductions is necessarily programmed 
because of legally required deductions. Therefore deducting dues is simply one added deduction 
and an electronic transfer of the total to the union. Computerization has dramatically reduced 
the cost and time required for payroll administration. See Michael Cohn, New Options: 21st 
Century Payroll, ACCT. TECH., Feb./Mar. 1996, at 18; Ripley Rotch, Accounting Programs You 
Can More Than Count on, NATION'S Bus., June, 1995, at 45; see also Michigan Order, supra 
note 25, slip op. at 6-7 (noting that the Michigan legislature determined that any cost savings 
from elimination of dues deduction would be negligible and that the Defendants provided no 
additional evidence supporting the cost saving rationale for the statute). 
107. See Ricci v. Stefano, 557 U.S. 557, 597-605 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting 
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Three recent cases challenging dues deduction bans in Michigan, 
North Carolina and Wisconsin reveal some common elements 
supporting the claim that the motivation for their passage is either 
suppression of certain political views or retaliation for political 
activity or both.' 0' Since each of the laws applies to some but not all 
unions, the effect is to burden the speech of the disfavored 
organizations. If the complaint allegations and reported facts 
regarding enactment of the legislation are established in court, '°9 each 
of the laws was enacted using surreptitious and unusual, if not 
improper, legislative tactics. Each targeted particular unions that had 
recently engaged in political activities in opposition to proponents of 
the legislation. And in each case, leaders of the legislative body made 
public statements suggesting political motivations for the legislation. 
Consider the following allegations from the complaint of the 
unions challenging the Michigan dues deduction ban. 
36. On March 6, 2012, Michigan unions and their members, 
including Plaintiff unions, announced a petition drive to place an 
amendment to the Michigan Constitution on the November 2012 
general election ballot. The amendment would create a right to 
collective bargaining and protect that right from interference, and it 
would impair or invalidate a number of the laws restricting public 
employees' bargaining rights that had passed or were then pending 
in the Legislature. The ballot initiative campaign was announced at 
a press conference held at the Michigan Capitol and it was widely 
publicized. 
that based on the evidence a reasonable jury could find that the city did not discard the results 
of the firefighter promotion examination based on concern about liability but instead to satisfy a 
politically important constituency). Ricci did not involve legislative action but rather the actions 
of the civil service board. Id. The concerns about inquiry into motivation, however, apply 
similarly to actions of legislative and administrative bodies. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Where the question is whether a decision was based on 
viewpoint discrimination, inquiry into motivation is essential. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812-13 (1985) (remanding for determination of whether 
exclusion of advocacy organization from the federal employees' fundraising campaign was 
based on viewpoint). 
108. In addition, similar elements appear in Alabama Education Ass'n v. Bentley. 788 F. 
Supp. 2d 1283, 1295-97 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (detailing the Alabama Education Association's 
conflicts with the Republican administration leading up to the limitations on payroll deduction, 
first implemented by the administration and then enacted into law by a special session of the 
legislature held just before the Governor left office). Although the Alabama law does not 
differentiate between unions, the law does allow deductions for other organizations that use 
funds for political purposes without similar restrictions. Id. at 1298. 
109. The North Carolina law has been enjoined from taking effect on both procedural and 
substantive constitutional grounds, see Temporary Restraining Order at 11 2-29, N.C. Ass'n of 
Educators v. North Carolina, No. 12 CVS 404 (N.C. Superior Ct. Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter N.C. 
TRO]; N.C. Preliminary Injunction, supra note 6, at 11; N.C. Order supra note 6, at 2, while the 
challenge to the Wisconsin law on procedural grounds ultimately failed in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court. See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. 2011). 
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37. On the following day, March 7, 2012, the Senate Reforms, 
Restructuring and Reinventing Committee took up HB 4929 
[banning payroll dednction of dues for education unions], which 
had lain dormant for over five months. With minimal notice to the 
public and no public hearings, the Committee adopted and 
recommended passage of a slightly altered substitute to HB 4929. 
Within two hours of being reported out by the Committee, HB 
4929 was put to a vote of the Senate, with the Senate majority 
suspending Senate rules in order to bring the bill to an immediate 
vote. The bill passed by a vote of 20 to 18. The Senate substitute to 
HB 4929 was transmitted to the Michigan House of 
Representatives immediately. Within one hour of receiving the bill, 
the House suspended its rules and adopted the bill by a vote of 56 
to 54, and also voted to give the Bill immediate effect. The entire 
enactment process was completed in an extraordinarily short time -
five hours during one session day .... The bill was presented to the 
Governor of the State of Michigan on March 9, 2012, who signed 1t 
into law on March 15, 2012.110 
619 
At least as alleged, the dues deduction ban was prompted by a 
political action campaign by the targeted unions, announced the day 
prior to the enactment of the legislation, which had lain dormant for 
months and was resurrected and passed within hours after the union's 
announcement of its political campaign, using a suspension of rules in 
both chambers. The enactment of the dues deduction ban will clearly 
impact the unions' ability to effectuate the petition drive by limiting 
their ability to collect dues, requiring them to invest in an alternative 
and almost certainly less effective collection mechanism, and 
therefore limiting their available resources. According to the 
complaint, the petition drive followed a series of legislative 
enactments curbing collective bargaining rights and reducing the 
benefits of school employees, which triggered a political response by 
the union, including a recall effort directed against the primary 
sponsor of the legislation.111 The complaint also quotes the Speaker of 
the House stating that the union has "declared war" by promoting 
recalls and the Senate Majority Leader as saying "[t]he teachers 
union specifically the Michigan Education Association have lost their 
(sic) way and public school employees should no longer be forced to 
join them."112 Further as in most other cases, the ban applies to one 
110. Complaint at 1j[1j[ 36-37, Bailey v. Callaghan, No. 2:12-cv-11504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 
2012) [hereinafter Cornplaint]. A first aincnded coinplaint was filed on April 18, 2012, with 
substantially similar allegations. First Amended Complaint at 1l1l 38-39, Bailey v. Callaghan, No . 
2:12-cv-11504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2012) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. 
111. Complaint, supra note 110, at <J[~[ 30-33. 
112. Id. 11 33. 
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group of public employees and their unions (those in public 
education), leaving others free to utilize governmental dues 
deduction mechanisms.113 The District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan enjoined the legislation from taking effect, concluding 
that the union plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of both 
their Equal Protection and First Amendment claims."' The court 
found no rational basis for the legislation, suggesting that it appeared 
to be directed at limiting the power and the speech of a politically 
1 bd . •115 unpopu ar group ase on v1ewpomt. 
The North Carolina legislation followed a similar pattern. The 
complaint alleges that the enactment of the legislation limiting dues 
deduction for the only large educational union violated the North 
Carolina Constitution, because it was improperly enacted using a veto 
override at a midnight session convened solely to consider another 
bill. 116 Despite numerous legislative sessions and a Senate override 
vote, the House of Representatives failed for months to consider 
overriding the Governor's veto of the legislation, which was 
scheduled to take effect July 1, 2011.111 Then in January 2012 after a 
late night veto session called for the sole purpose of considering 
another vetoed bill, the House adjourned and reconvened to override 
the Governor's veto on the dues deduction bill, which it did at 12:45 
a.m.
11
' The North Carolina Superior Court issued a temporary 
restraining order, and later preliminary and permanent injunctions, 
preventing. the legislation from taking effect on grounds that these 
procedures violated the state constitution. 11' 
Like the Michigan and Wisconsin bills, the North Carolina 
legislation did not affect all public employees and their unions. 
Indeed, in this case only one union was affected, the North Carolina 
Association of Educators. 120 The Speaker of the House was quoted as 
stating that the legislation was prompted by the Association's 
113. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 53, §lO(l)(b). 
114. Michigan Order, supra note 25, al 5-11. 
115. Id. 
116. Verified Complaint at I)[~[ 2-29, N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. North Carolina, No. 12 CVS 
404 (N.C. Superior Ct. Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Verified Complaint]. 
117. Id. U 12-15. 
118. Id. H 14-29. 
119. N.C. TRO, supra note 109, at ii 2-29; N.C. Preliminary Injunction, supra note 6, at <][1; 
N.C. Order, supra note 6, at 2. The permanent injunction is based on both the procedural 
violations and unconstitutional "retaliatory viewpoint discrimination." Id. 
120. Brief In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 23, N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. North Carolina, No. 12 CVS 
404 (N.C. Superior Ct. Mar. 28, 2012). 
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mailings targeting Democrats who had voted with Republicans on the 
state budget, and he subsequently acknowledged that the 
organization's politics were a factor in the legislation.121 As in the case 
of Michigan, these statements reflect the strategic timing of the 
legislation, in direct response to political activity by the Association. 
Finally, the highly publicized Wisconsin legislation reveals a 
similar pattern. It was peculiarly structured using unprecedented 
classifications that targeted unions which did not support the 
governor's election, while preserving dues deduction for unions that 
supported the Governor.122 Statements by State Senate Majority 
Leader Scott Fitzgerald were clearer than even those in Michigan and 
North Carolina regarding the intent to suppress political views. 
Fitzgerald stated, 
If we win this battle [over the passage of the Act], and the money is 
not there nuder the auspices of the unions, certainly what you're 
going to find is President Obama is going to have a ... much more 
difficult time getting elected and winning the state of Wisconsin.123 
As in Michigan and Nor.th Carolina, quick votes and limited 
opportunities for public input at hearings characterized the legislative 
process. Initial efforts to pass the legislation surfaced quickly and 
surprised advocates, resulting in the escape of the Democratic 
legislators to Illinois to avoid passage.124 The actual passage involved 
parliamentary maneuvers that were challenged as violative of the 
Open Meetings Law and state constitutional provisions requiring 
open hearings.125 The law was passed quickly without opportunity for 
debate. 126 
121. See Verified Complaint, supra note 116, at <Jl 50; Laura Leslie, State Seeks Dismissal of 
NCAE Lawsuit, WRAL.com (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.wral.com/news/slatc/nccapitol/ 
blogpost/10928368/#commentform); John Rottet, N.C. teachers group says it was in GOP's 
sights, newsobservcr.cotn, (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/01/06/1756668/ 
teachers-group-says-it-was-in.html. 
122. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856, 859, 863-65 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
123. Combined Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 53, Wis. Educ. Ass'n 
Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (No.11-cv-428-winc). 
124. See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436, 442 (Wis. 2011); Murrey 
Jacobson, Wis. Senate's Surprise Vote to Restrict Bargaining Stuns Union.1·, Democrats, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 9, 2011, 11:24 PM EDT), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ 
2011/03/wis-senates-surprise-vote-to-restrict-bargaining-stuns-unions-democrats.html>. 
125. Ozanne, 798 N.W. 2d at 442-43. The circuit court enjoined the law from taking effect 
but the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled the decision on separation of powers grounds, 
rejecting the challenges to the procedure. Id. at 439-40. 
126. Id. at 442-43. One might argue, of course, that the questionable parliamentary 
maneuvers were prompted by the need to respond to the delaying tactics of the legislators who 
opposed the bill. 
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There is an unmistakable pattern in the passage of the legislation 
in these three states, revealing political purposes behind the 
enactments.127 This pattern may not be surprising in light of recent 
publicity about the efforts of the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) to enact conservative legislation in states across the 
country, developing model legislation through its membership of 
legislators and predominantly corporate private-sector members.128 
ALEC works with other conservative think tank organizations, and 
their policy papers and proposed legislation reveal a goal of 
elimination of payroll deduction of union dues.12' Given these efforts, 
along with Republican successes at the state level in 2010, the 
emergence of strikingly similar legislative campaigns was predictable. 
As noted previously, the current critique of provisions mandating 
union dues or payroll deduction is often couched in terms of the 
unwarranted political power that collection of union dues provides to 
labor organizations.13° Citizens United, however, firmly rejected the 
notion that restrictions on speech can be justified because of the 
distorting effect resulting from aggregating power in the corporate 
127. Each of the three pieces of legislation has been enjoined, with judges finding either a 
likelihood of success on the merits or actual unconstitutionality in each case. 
128. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 94; f!istory, supra note 94. 
129. See, . e.g., PAUL KERSEY, MACKJ~AC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, POLICY BRIEF, 
MICIIlGAN'S PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT: PUBLIC-SECTOR LABOR LAW AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2009), available at <http://www.mackinac.org/archives/2009/S2009-07.pdf> 
(arguing ~at public employee unions use dues money furnished by the government to advocate 
for political causes that harm the state and its citizens, creating a "taxpayer funded lobby for big 
government", id. at 18, and advocating change in the law); Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Public 
Employer Payroll Deduction Policy Act, ALEC EXPOSED, <http://alecexposed.org/w/ 
images/c/c9/1R9-Public_Employer_Payroll_Deduction_ Policy_Acl_Exposed.pdf> (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2012) (prohibiting payroll deduction of union dues by public employers); Ctr. for 
Media & Democracy, Public Employer Payroll Deduction Policy Act, ALEC EXPOSED, 
<http://alec exposed.org/w/images/b/b8/Paycheck_Protection_Act_Exposed.pdf> (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2012) (prohibiting unions from using dues for political activities and prohibiting payroll 
deduction of funds for political activities without compliance with specific limitations and 
mandatory disclosures and providing criminal penalties for violations). For information about 
the connections between the Mackinac Center, ALEC and other similar organizations, see 
Brendan Fischer, Koch-Funded Mackinac Center Brings Wisconsin Act 10 Provisions to ALEC, 
CIR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (May 1, 2012, 7:37 AM), http://www.prwatch.org/ncws/2012 
/05/11490/koch-funded-mackinac-center-brings-wisconsin-act-10-provisions-alec (indicating that 
l(ersey of the Mackinac Center would be proposing for adoption as model legislation a bill 
similar to Wisconsin's Act 10 at an upcoming ALEC committee meeting). 
130. See, e.g., KERSEY, supra note 129, at 17-19; Are Dues Check-Off and Agency Shop in 
the Public Interest?, PUBLIC SECTOR INC., <htlp://www.publicsectorinc.com/online_debates 
/2012/04/are-dues-check-off-and-agency-shop-in-the-public-interest.html> (last visited Nov. 27, 
2012 (comments of Daniel DiSalvo, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for State 
and Local Leadership and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the City College of New 
York); sources cited supra note 87. 
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formm Similarly, the articulated justification is not a constitutional 
reason to limit dues collection for unions.112 While more attenuated in 
terms of evidentiary value, these rationales proffered by think tanks 
connected to ALEC, which is composed of corporate and legislative 
members, provide context to the legislative proposals, their timing, 
the procedures relating to their enactment, and the statements by 
legislative leaders that suggest the motivation for the legislation. 
Further, each of the three states focused the dues restrictions on 
educational employee unions, Michigan and North Carolina 
exclusively, and Wisconsin, along with general state and local 
employee unions. As in the case of public-sector unions generally, 
political rhetoric and research from conservative organizations and 
politicians has focused heavily on teachers and their unions as 
impediments to education reform.133 Notably these conservative 
groups frequently cite the size, power, and political spending of the 
National Education Association, the largest union in the country."' 
131. Citizens United v. Fcd'l Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 903-05 (20iO). 
132. In enjoining the Michigan legislation, the judge stated: "The attempt to undercut union 
power coupled with the legislative history of Act 53 strongly supports the argu1nent that 
Defendants' real motive for the amendment was to suppress an unpopular group." Michigan 
Order, supra note 25, slip op. at 8. The Michigan defendants offered the purpose of restricting 
union power as an intended goal of the legislation. Id. at 6. 
133. See, e.g., Bills Affecting Aniericans' Rights to a Public Education, ALEC EXPOSED {last 
modified Jan. 30, 201.2, 5:23 PM), <http://alecexposed.org/wiki/Bills_Affecting_A1nericans 
o/o27 _Rights_to_a_Public_Education>; Lindsay Burke, Creating a Crisis: Unions Stifle 
Education Refonn, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 20, 201.0), <http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2010/07/crcating-a-crisis-unions-stifle-education-reform>; Jessica Calcfati, Gov. Christie: 
N.TEA Leaders Are "Bullies" that Use a "$130 Million S!ushfund", NJ.COM (updated May 4, 
2012, 5:57 AM), <http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/05/gov_christie_njca_lcaders_are. 
html>; Jn1pact of Teachers Unions on Education and Schools, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 7, 
2011 ), <http://www.heritage.org/mul timedia/video/2011/09/impact -of -teachers-unions-on-educa 
lion-and-schools>; Teachers Unions Oppose Education Reform, TEACHERS UNION EXPOSED, 
<http://teachersunionexposed.com/ blocking.cfm> (last visited Nov. 27, 2012); see also Ala. 
Educ. Ass'n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296-98 (N.D. Ala. 201.1) {describing political 
conflicts between the Alabama Education Association and the governor and a state senator and 
gubernatorial candidate who attacked the association as "the single greatest impediment to 
quality education in this state .... "). 
134. See Burke, supra note 133; About NEA, NAT'L Eouc. Ass'N, <http://www.nea.org/ 
home/2580.htm> (last visited Nov. 27, 201.2 (describing NEA as largest professional employee 
organization in the U.S. with three 1nillion members and affiliates in every state); National 
Education Association Form LM-2 (2011.), available at <http://kcerds.dol-esa.gov/query 
/getOrgQry.do> (in "Union Name by Abbreviation" drop down menu, select "NBA-National 
Education ASN IND," in "Report Type," drop down menu, select "LM-2," select the "submit" 
button at the bottom of the screen; on the results page, scroll to file number 000-342, and click 
on "201.1 Report" link in the second column) (showing total membership of 3,167,412 and total 
receipts of $391,147,761). According to the National Institute on Money in State Politics, the 
NEA and its affiliates were the top political donors in 2007-08, contributing over $56 million. 
Nat'l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Top National Donors, FOLLOwTHEMONEY, <http://www. 
followthemoney.org/database/top10000.phtn11> {last visited Nov. 27, 201.2). 
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One can trace a direct line from this rhetoric and research to various 
legislative proposals to reform education, along with efforts to limit 
the power of teachers' unions to oppose such reform. And the 
political maneuverings in each state and the statements of the 
legislators confirm this intent to limit the voice of the education 
unions in the legislative process. Establishing unequal burdens on 
similarly situated unions, supplemented by evidence of political 
motivation is the most promising route to invalidating state 
embargoes on payroll deduction of union dues under both First 
Amendment and Equal Protection Doctrine. In the absence of a 
direct burden or differential treatment based on the speech or 
speaker, however, a rational basis for restrictions will suffice. 
2. Negating the Proffered Motivations 
Legislators supporting bans on union dues almost always proffer 
viewpoint neutral, apolitical explanations for dues bans, despite their 
political rhetoric. To sustain a challenge, opponents of dues bans must 
be prepared to negate these rationales, a much easier task where a 
compelling justification is required.135 Among the more common 
rationales offered in recent cases are the following: 1) avoiding 
involvement of the government in partisan politics;136 2) preserving 
government funds and reducing administrative burdens;137 3) ensuring 
union ac.countability and individual responsibility;1' 8 4) preventing 
political pressure on employees' to authorize dues deductions;13' and 
5) "reflect[ing] and encourag[ing] technological advances in local, 
private'banking" that allow automatic dues deduction."" 
Only two of these have been previously successful. Ysursa 
approved the rationale of avoiding government entanglement in 
politics, but that case involved a complete ban on political dues 
deduction. 141 Where the ban is limited to one or several unions or 
135. See United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 
1126 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
136. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 355, 361 (2009); Defendant's 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and In Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 15-16, N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. North Carolina, 12 CVS 404 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012) (hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum]. 
137. Defendants' Me1norandum, supra note 136, at 1-2; Defendants' Brief In Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Bailey v. Callaghan, No.2:12-cv-11504 (E.D. 
Mich. 2012) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief]. 
138. Id. at 7; Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 136, at 1-2. 
139. Id. at 15-16. 
140. Id. at 16. 
141. 555 U.S. at 361 n.3. 
I. 
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even where it allows payment of dues to political organizations with 
other government funds, it casts doubt on the state's justification even 
under a rational basis test."' It is certainly not intuitively obvious why 
it is more important to ban government entanglement in politics in 
education but not law enforcement, for example. North Carolina 
mentions the education of children,143 as if the entanglement to be 
avoided would have some impact on children, but there is no 
apparent involvement of children in payroll deduction, and teachers 
as well as other government employees have every right to engage in 
political activity regardless of their membership in the union or the 
deduction of their dues. 
The Fourth Circuit found in South Carolina Education Ass'n v. 
Campbell that administrative burdens and cost to government 
justified restricting dues deduction to unions with membership open 
to all employees."' Among the additional reasons was the desire to 
foster strong relations with the state's own employees.
1
'
15 
Unions 
challenging bans should be prepared to show that the administrative 
burdens and costs are subst'antially reduced in the current age of 
computer-processed payroll."' In addition, they may show the 
absence of a fit between the law and the rationale.147 For example, a 
desire to reduce administrative burdens and costs might justify 
limiting the number of unions or other organizations that could 
demand payroll deduction, but selecting particular unions for the ban 
instead of using neutral criteria or criteria related to the objective148 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the rationale. 
The other articulated rationales also suffer from a poor fit 
142. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994); Ala. Educ. Ass'n v. Bentley, 788 F. 
Supp. 2d 1283, 1297 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (noting that the Alabarna la\v banning all dues deduction 
allowed the government to pay dues to other organizations that engaged in political activity 
such as municipal leagues and school board associations). 
143. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 136, al 16. 
144. 883F.2d1251, 1263-64 (4th Cir. 1989). 
145. Id. at 1264. 
146. South Carolina Educ. Ass'n was decided in 1989. In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, 
International Ass'n of Firefighters, decided in 1976, the union apparently accepted the city's 
contention that it would be expensive and burdensome to deduct dues for every requesting 
organization. 426 U.S. 283, 287 (1976). 
147. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (stating "even in the ordinary equal 
protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation 
between the classification adopted and the object to be attained. The search for the link 
between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides 
guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can 
pass; and it marks the limits of our own authority."). 
148. An example of criteria related to the objective would be certified unions or unions with 
a certain level of membership. 
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between the objective and the means, if the deduction ban is less than 
complete. While legislatures need not regulate precisely and can 
engage in incremental legislation,"' "by requmng that the 
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and 
legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn 
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."
1
'
0 
Thus, unions must marshal evidence relevant to the particular 
jurisdiction to establish the absence of a rational connection and the 
likelihood of a purpose of disadvantaging the targeted employees and 
their unions. 1' 1 With such evidence, unions may be able to sustain a 
constitutional challenge to limitations on payroll deduction that are 
less than total bans.1' 2 
VI. THE REALITY FOR UNIONS 
The previous sections suggest that at least some current laws 
limiting dues deduction may be vulnerable to challenge on 
constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to be too 
sanguine about the prospects for invalidation. Much of the evidence 
supporting political motivation is of a sort that courts are often 
reluctant to countenance. Without concrete, admissible evidence of 
an unconstitutional motive, the court need only find a rational reason 
for the legislation. It need not even be the reason offered by the 
legislature, so long as there is·.no evidence of improper motivation. 
And while Romer offers hope of establishing a discriminatory 
motivation, courts are far less sensitive to discrimination against labor 
unions and their supporters than to discrimination on other invidious 
bases. Although conservative judges have been solicitous of 
challenges to restrictions on corporate speech, unions cannot be 
149. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (stating that "[t}he 
problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. 
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different 
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing 
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind" (citations 
omitted)). 
150. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
151. In Michigan, for example, the legislation took the fonn of an amendment to the 
statutory provision barring certain employer assistance to unions. Michigan Order, supra note 
25, slip op. at 3-4. The court concluded that the purpose of the provision was to maintain the 
independence of unions and found that the proffered rationales of cost savings, union 
accountability, and restricting union power had no rational relationship to that purpose, 
particularly when applied only to certain unions. Id. at 5-8. 
152. In some states, the state constitution may provide another avenue of challenge where 
the provisions are more favorable to the union's claims than the federal constitution. 
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certain that similar solicitude will prevail in the case of challenges to 
limitations on laws limiting payroll deduction for unions, Unions have 
rarely succeeded in recent dues cases in the Supreme Court,153 
Furthermore, successful challenges to targeted bans may result in 
more drastic action: laws banning all payroll deduction of 
organizational dues, Under current Supreme Court precedent, such 
laws will almost certainly survive challenge, Accordingly, unions must 
consider alternative methods of dues collection, Automatic bank 
drafts or credit card payments offer an alternative to employer 
payroll deduction which, while not equivalent in value to the union, 
provide a method of collection that is relatively efficient and requires 
a reduced expenditure of union resources, Employees can terminate 
these deductions more easily than employer-based deductions, 
however, requiring the union to engage in continual marketing to 
convince employees of the value of their union membership, While 
this effort too requires investment of funds, the currerit climate, with 
the massive sums of money expended by affluent union opponents to 
convince employees that unions are not acting in their best interest, 
makes such campaigning essential to survival and effective employee 
representation. Organizing is the sine qua non of unions in a society 
where the recurring question seems to be "What have you done for 
153. See, e.g., l(nox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012); Ysursa v. 
Pcatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009); Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 184 
(2007) (stating, when describing the union's authority to collect the costs of representation from 
the employees that it represents, "it is undeniably unusual for a government agency to give a 
private entity the power, in essence, to tax government employees" and referring to this 
collection as an "extraordinary" power). The Knox Court not only ruled against the union on 
the issue before the Court, but also reached out to decide an issue neither briefed nor argued. 
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment). The Court held that the union 
had to issue a separate notice of the right to object when it implemented a special assessment 
during the year after the annual notice had already been issued. Id. at 2291-93 (majority 
opinion). Further, the Court concluded that the union could not charge objectors even the 
percentage of the assessment that represented chargeable expenses from the previous year, 
although this resulted in objectors failing to pay the full cost of representation. Id. at 2293-96. 
Finally, the Court ruled that nonmembers could not be charged the assessment unless they 
opted in, instead of applying the opt out rule used by all prior cases, a position not even 
advocated by the plaintiffs. Id. at 2292-93; id. at 2297, 2298-99 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
judgn1ent); id. at 2303-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority opinion extensively discussed 
and critiqued previous decisions allowing the union to charge nonmembers the cost of 
representation unless they opted out of the charges, although not overruling those decisions. See 
id. at 2288-91. For criticism of /(nox as inconsistent with Citizens United and other cases 
involving associational speech rights, see Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Che1nerinsky, Political 
Speech and Association Rights After l(nox v. SElU Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. No. 6 
(forthcoming 2013). For pre-Knox criticism of the difference in treatment between unions and 
corporations with respect to use of dissenters' funds for political purposes, see Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt out Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV, 800 (2012), 
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me lately?" Only where employees see unions as an effective vehicle 
for workplace voice and workplace benefits will unions be sustainable 
organizations in both the public and private sectors. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Union dues are the lifeblood of labor organizations. No 
organization can operate effectively without resources. As attacks on 
unions and collective bargaining escalate, resources are more 
important than ever to enable unions to support employees and 
maintain their rights and benefits, as well as their voice in the 
workplace. Continued organization of both members and 
nonmembers is crucial to insure the necessary commitment of 
employees to unions. Employee commitment is the first step to 
maintaining funding, but, particularly in tough economic times, an 
efficient and effective dues collection method is essential to insure 
that even committed members continue to support the union. Where 
payroll deduction is possible, that may be the method of choice. But 
given the political climate and the legal reality, unions wonld be wise 
to explore recurring bank drafts or credit card charges as an 
alternative. The attacks on unions, and the efforts to restrict their 
funds, are not likely to recede in the current partisan political climate. 
